János Farkas:
(Paper
delivered at Infocommunication Techniques and Man, a conference organised by
the Communications Conciliatory Forum. Budapest, 19th February 2004.
Published in Infocommunication Technologies and Man. Edited by Dr. Imre Mojzes.
Műegyetemi Kiadó, Budapest, 2004. Pp. 79-108.)
Introduction: Do we have a Theory of
Man?
As
a sociologist, I seem to identify the relation of dependent and independent
variabels (X, Y) in the topic of this conference. The first part of the title,
infocommunication techniques, can be clearly defined as the entirety of
information technology and communication devices and systems. “Man” or “the
human factor”, however, is less known, the most we can come up with are
metaphors and analogies, therefore we do not have sufficient knowledge about
the relation of the two variabels. When we acquire knowledge about the material
world, from which these devices arise, we are heading towards the conceptual
unity of natural sciences and engineering. The essence of man, however, cannot
yet be explained by a unified theory of causality. Due to the complexity of
society and the labyrinth-like, inexhaustible sources of human motivation,
social sciences and humanities are burdened by a „cognitive delay”, compared to
our knowledge of nature and the artificial world. The problem is not that we
know little, but we are unable to create a unified theory for this knowledge.
As shown by the development of technology, we
are doing rather well in understanding nature. We have two proven theories for
the unified principles that our world is governed by. One is the atomic theory
and the other is evolution. We can use assertions, concerning the inorganic and
organic parts of nature, which can be proven by experiments. We had the
opportunity to explore the physiology of thinking, the possibilities of
artificial intelligence and emotions, as well as use neurobiology to study the
learning process in the context of molecular biology.
The
question is, can we extend the theories of natural sciences to learn about
society and man? Can we develop a unified theory of man, based on natural and
social sciences? Why do we insist on providing a theoretical explanation for
our world? Because in science nothing makes sense without theories. It is in
our nature to collect everything we know into a certain context, to create one
story, the recreation of our world. The biggest challenge of our time is to
describe complex systems accurately and extensively. While descriptive and
analytic social sciences are real sciences, social theory is not a real theory,
because it lacks the system of causal explanations, reaching all the way from
the organisational level of society to the mind or the brain and vice versa,
rising from the brain to the level of society.
1. Knowledge deficit concerning
man
I
wish to use the previous statement to develop my hypothesis on knowledge
deficit, claiming that we do not have a unified theory of man, who becomes
associated with the devices of modern technology, depending on his/her
circumstances.
Information and/or knowledge
society, the social prerequisites and consequences of infocommunication
devices, human behaviour, motivation and so on give rise to incredibly complex
problems. We do not have sufficient knowledge to provide an answer for these
problems. This is what I call “knowledge deficit”. Due to this insufficient (or
mosaic-like) knowledge we tend to develop caricature-like models, being unable
to use good teleological and sound simulation models. In my view “knowledge
deficit” means in this context that we have yet to fully define how the use of
infocommunication devices becomes more extensive in society, what kinds of
opposition arise during the process and what types of social and political
impacts or even problems are generated? That is why we find it difficult to
define the notions of information or knowledge society. The main problem lies
in the discrepancy between the “development (over-development) of technology”
and the “underdeveloped” nature of our social knowledge. This problem is
manifested in the contradictions between the rise of technical innovation and
the social process of its diffusion. Rogers examined the wider use of new
sowing-seeds among American farmers as early as the 1920’. He also looked at
which diffusion mechanisms are at play when consumers learn about new
medicines. It is always the human environment where technical achievements are
welcome or rejected.
When I was a student I came across
an enlightening idea by the famous Chinese philosopher, Lao-Tzu, who says that
in the long term the “soft” always overcomes the “hard”. But what is “soft” and
what is “hard” in human history? Before we answer this question, let me mention
another story. In a summer evening of 1977 we were waiting for our plane at the
London airport during a go-slow strike when philosopher László Mátrai turned to
me: “just watch, soon the subjective factor, man himself, shall become the
biggest objective obstacle”.
In 1980, in my lecture at a conference
organised by the International Institute for Applied
Systems Analysis (IIASA) in the Laxenburg Palace (Austria) I discussed
the following problem: why is it that the mathematically exact and complex
models of system theory, developed to solve the problems of Lake Balaton’s
ecology or the food and energy shortages of our planet cannot be put into
practice at all or when they are, they are far from being efficient? (1) I
talked about the concealed, absent or incorrect presuppositions, which resulted
in the “crisis” of system theory (or the buzzword of the time: operations
research). I felt that modern systems models lacked an adequate “concept of man
and society” and their failures can be traced back, among other things, to this
hiatus.
In his famous book, published in the
late 1960’s, renowned Hungarian economist, Ferenc Jánossy, explored the secrets
of so-called “economic miracles” and booms, witnessed after wars and crises.
(2) He uses the following analogue: if a yacht seems to be gliding fast, but is
held back by an invisible underwater rope, this would limit and break its
speed. This “invisible rope” is the trend line, the steepness of which is
determined by the development of the labour force. The speed of economic
progress, therefore, does not depend on the development activity itself, but
rather on the diffusion speed of its results. The question is, what are the fundamental
principles that determine the diffusion speed of research results (in our case
infocommunication devices)? Competition is often mentioned as the main spring
of the development process. The pace of the clock, however, does not depend on
the strength of this spring. Instead, it is controlled by the balance wheel, a
tiny swinging wheel. What is this regulator and how does it work? The diffusion
of technical achievements can only maintain a certain pace, which is tolerated
by the immense resistance. This is how the controlling role of anti-diffusion
resistance works. The regulating force within the pace of development lies in
this resistance. According to Jánossy, the aforementioned resistance is the
“job structure”. I am inclined to make his statement more general: the
resistance depends on the historically and socially defined level of people’s
general and professional knowledge, abilities and motivation.
If we wish to describe the diffusion process of
infocommunication devices, including all the prerequisites and consequences, we
need to review economic and social progress in its entirety. What is more, if
we decide to explore the preconditions of new technical discoveries, we need to
go back several decades in evolution. Marx rightfully ridiculed those who had
said that price is determined by the supply-demand ratio. This ratio can only
divert the price of a product from its value, but it can never determine price
itself. The same is true for the interaction between developmental centres.
These interactions can influence the diffusion of technical devices, but cannot
become the general and primary determining factor of diffusion speed. When
mountaineers are linked to each other by a rope during climbing, this rope not
only holds back those who are too fast and daring, but it also helps weaker
climbers, who are lagging behind. Nobody thinks, however, says Jánossy, that it
is the rope itself that pulls climbers to the top or determines the speed of
the ascent.
This lecture sets out to analyse the driving
and resistant forces that determine the diffusion speed of infocommunication
discoveries and the scale of their use. The driving force is none other than
the possibility of saving abstract human work and the resistance to be overcome
arises from the need to change a certain method of activity. Resistance can be
described by an objective quantitative measurement, although it cannot be
expressed by numbers. We shall find this resistance in “man”, where inertness
must be distinguished from resistance itself.
Here we reach the point when Lao Tzu’s “soft”
and “hard” elements appear in the title of the conference (Infocommunication
Techniques and Man). Csaba Pléh writes the following in the special edition of
the periodical, Information Society: “The scientific interpretation and use of
“soft elements”, known as informational or, in other areas, cognitive change or
dominance of information-handling people, puts this causal question to a
different prospective.” (3) If I understand it correctly, he thinks that within
technical and cultural evolution “technical” development stands for the hard,
while changes in “culture” and traditions represent the “soft” element. As far
as their interaction is concerned, “soft elements” determine the diffusion
speed of “hard elements”. Jánossy’s regulators and resistances can be found in
society’s “soft”, human and cultural aspects.
The following quote by Manuel Castells, the
leading theoretician of Network Society perfectly demonstrates the essence of
my examples: “Yet there is an extraordinary gap between our technological overdevelopment and our social
underdevelopment. Our economy, society, and culture are built on interests,
values, institutions, and systems of representation that, by and large, limit
collective creativity, confiscate the harvest of information technology, and
deviate our energy into self-destructive confrontation.” (4)
I come to the conclusion from his words that
desirable growth, in this case the extensive and effective use of
infocommunication devices, is held back by the underdevelopment of society and
its people, the “soft” counterpart of the “hard” technical sector. How is this
“underdevelopment” manifested? I think the word “underdeveloped” does not
describe the state of society (because society is what it is when it functions
organically), but refers to the level of our knowledge of society. If this is
true, the “knowledge gap” is probably found on the cognitive level. In my
opinion there is an extraordinary gap between the levels of our scientific knowledge
(about nature) and our knowledge of society (and the human nature). This large
discrepancy between our scientific and social knowledge is what I refer to as
“knowledge deficit” in the title of my paper.
Various
concepts of man emerged during history; the most typical ones are the
following:
Natural (primitive) man.
Man governed by transcendental
forces.
Man of self-actualisation, creative
man.
Man as a species being.
Man as a zoon politicon, as part of
a community.
Ascetic man
Homo oeconomicus (productive, modern
man)
Hedonist (consuming,
pleasure-seeking) man.
Postmodern man.
We can also choose from other types,
such as inner-directed, other-directed (organisational) or autonomic man.
When
it comes to man, Socrates focuses on education, Plato on ideas, Descartes on
innate notions, Saint Augustine on man’s striving for transcendence, Feuerbach
on love and desires, Adam Smith on selfishness and Marx on the importance and
omnipotence of social conditions.
We
should examine what kind of concept the information and/or knowledge society
has of man.
It would be fairly obvious to choose
the “rational homo oeconomicus”, who is characterised by a complete and logical
preference system. This enables him to choose from the available alternatives.
Let us assume that he is fully aware of these alternatives and the elaborate
calculations for determining the best alternative are not restricted in any
way. This probability is not scary or mysterious for him. However, we should
have more knowledge about how people decide, determine and choose from the
alternatives. One of rational man’s subtypes is the “administrative man”, who,
contrary to the economic man, looks for a course of action that is
satisfactory, rather than making optimal decisions. The cost of information,
required to find the optimal alternative, as well as unpredictable changes
drive him to make satisfactory, instead of profit-maximising decisions. This
pattern also works on the individual level.
I am inclined to assume that real
man is not strictly rational, not a homo oeconomicus, but instead is
full of inner conflicts and self-contradiction, often making him act
inconsistently. His preferences change, these preferences are sometimes fixed,
sometimes not.
2. The unity of natural and social sciences
After reading and re-reading the works of the
most eminent natural scientists my theory of knowledge deficit seems to become
increasingly clear. (5) Let me briefly summarise my experiences on the matter.
If there is a “knowledge gap” and “knowledge
deficit”, it is demonstrated on the level of scientific cognition by the lack
of unified science, when knowledge is broken up to isolated fragments. There is
no genuine passage between the understanding of nature and society. If we fail
to discover continuity between nature and society, it seems we have given up
our belief that the world can be explained by a few, systematically developed
laws. This theorem has already been proven in the understanding of nature.
Nature research (vagy The research of Nature…) has been using objective reality
as a starting point since Ionian natural philosophy. Einstein also believed
that we have to unify our knowledge, because that is the only way to really
understand who we are and why we are here. The human mind has always been
searching for links between natural and social sciences. Natural and social
phenomena are obviously not identical, but their deeper, common characteristics
can be united by “consilience”, as suggested by American scientist, Wilson. (6)
Charles Sherrington (1941) compared the brain
to an enchanted loom, perpetually reweaving complete miniature universes. (7)
World culture, the “collective mind” works the same way. The origin and nature
of the “loom”, therefore the entire human condition can be explained by general
rules, which apply to genetic evolution and modern culture alike.
When
preparing for today’s lecture, I re-read one of the classics in information
technology, János Neumann’s book on the kindred problems of modern digital
calculators and the logical structure of the cerebrum. (8) Can you see the
resemblance to Wilson’s “consilience”, metaphor and Sherrington’s “loom”
analogy?
We should admit at last that mankind’s major
problems (ethnic conflicts, armament crisis, overpopulation, abortion,
environmental protection, epidemics) could only be solved by integrating
natural, social and human sciences. The previously mentioned system models did
not work when applied to reality, because apart from the “hard”, exact facts,
the social, human, cultural and political “soft” environment was miscalculated.
The solidity of the model’s elements was not identical; correctly calculated
elements were absorbed in the miscalculated social environment without impacts
and consequences. A single sentence by Gyula Illyés got to the heart of the
matter better than any complex system model. He says: The question is, who owns
Lake Balaton? Complicated mathematical and ecological models lacked interests,
values and passions, therefore they failed to work when applied to reality.
The dream of Intellectual Unity was the product
of French Enlightenment, but this dream has since failed. Enlightenment and
modernisation declined because we failed to explore human motivations,
behaviours, mentalities, needs, interests and values, and more importantly we
are unable to trace them back to and link with our solid and proven knowledge
about natural science and technology. It has been demonstrated that nature is a
systematic material entity, which is governed by exact laws and can be divided
into measurable and hierarchic entities. Society, on the other hand, consists
of people, whose brains are made up of neurons, where nerves form brains and
individuals form societies, assuming that all this is a system of forces and
mechanisms. Condorcet’s 1785 essay makes him the forerunner of modern decision
theory. He writes: “The sole foundation for belief in
the natural sciences is this idea, that the general laws directing the
phenomena of the universe, known or unknown, are necessary and constant. Why
should this principle be any less true for the development of the intellectual
and moral faculties of man than for the other operations of nature?” (9)
Unfortunately, the development of cognition
disintegrated in the 19th and 20th centuries. The notion of Order was replaced
by the notion of Chaos in people’s minds. Snow’s 1959 lecture on the two
cultures actually canonised this situation: our understanding of nature and
culture has separated. (10) Since then we reached postmodernism, saying:
reality is not perceived, but constructed by the mind. What is it, if not a
protest against universal truths?
3. From genes to culture
Starting from physics towards society, the
complexity of systems undoubtedly increases. Among the systems of the Universe
that we already know, the most complex ones are the biological systems,
especially the human brain. The progress from physical to biological systems is
aided by several disciplines: biochemistry, molecular biology, cellular
biology, organism-level biology, ecology and evolutionary biology. Fundamental
principles, discovered during the study of these disciplines, are expected to
accelerate the research of mind, behaviours and ecosystems. We hope to know
more about how the brain reacts to stimuli from the organs of sense, how the information
is organised into patterns, how these patterns are transformed into words and
finally how subjective emotions are generated by the physical processes of the
brain?
Socio-biology studies genetic heritage and
characteristics of humans such as instincts of aggression, self-preservation,
altruism, sexual (race-preserving) instinct, kin selection, homosexuality,
anatomic and hormonal differences between genders, differences in highly
refined intellectual abilities, IQ, level of cerebral lateration, skills of
verbalisation and stereoscopic vision, development of anxieties and so on.
Studies with babies, healthy and retarded children and people of archaic
societies show that the course and organisation of our behaviour are also
influenced by inherited dispositions and inclinations.
At this point we are still very far from the
exact understanding of society. Research is yet to complete the journey from
genes to culture. Natural sciences have already established the system of
rational explanations, encompassing quantum physics, cerebrology and
evolutionary biology, reaching the boundaries of culture. Questions concerning
the diffusion and use of infocommunication devices can only be properly
answered, if we know more about human behaviour. Behaviour, however, is
transferred through culture. Let’s admit, at the moment we have very little
understanding of the relation between the genetic history of humans and the
cultural history of societies. Today, when I am writing this lecture, I read in
the paper that an American scientist of Hungarian origin discovered that
endocannabids, marihuana-like substances produced by the brain, play a role in
controlling appetite and even craving for alcohol. We, sociologists, so far
considered alcoholism as a phenomenon conditioned by society. (11)
Wilson claims that there is a co-evolution of
genes and culture, where genetic evolution is coupled by a parallel cultural
evolution. We could ask: Where is society in this? Culture is the product of
the collective mind and individual minds are the products of genetically
structured human brains. Genes and culture are linked inseparably, culture
being a collective, a social product. Here is an example for this link. It is
well known that most people are scared of snakes. In the individuals, this is
the product of genetically coded fear and awe, but in culture it produces
metaphors, tales and works of art.
When can also accept the assumption that not
only the structure or functioning of the brain, but also the behaviour of our
species develop through partly genetic, partly natural selection in
populations. As well as more successful ontogenesis, collective behavioural
rules are also used more extensively by certain groups of the population. Our
culture is also led on a “genetic leash”. Some cultural norms tend to survive
better and penetrate more successfully than their rivals. Cultural evolution
runs parallel with genetic evolution, but at a much faster pace. Have we ever
thought about why the use of some technical devices (such as cars, televisions,
mobile phones, computers, household devices) spreads much faster, almost in the
form of epidemic, than others? Which cultural norms stimulate or refuse (see
resistance) the acceptance of technology? Let us admit we are trapped. Trapped by
not only our genes, but also our culture. Surveys and statistics on the
penetration and diffusion of infocommunication devices over the last few years
consistently show that Hungary is ranked between 20th and 30th in the various
indices, irrespective of what the technical and economic policy favours. When
visiting China in the 1980’s I realised that modernisation only started in
coastal areas, where commerce and entrepreneurism have always been valued by
people, and where this was coupled with behavioural patterns of the puritan
ethos of Confucianism. Inner peasant areas, where trade was considered as
deceiving others, were unable to adopt the pace of modernisation.
Culture is a superorganism. According to
anthropologists: “Culture is a product; is historical; includes ideas,
patterns, and values; is selective; is learned; is based upon symbols; and is
an abstraction from behaviour and objects of behaviour” (12)
Today there are ongoing studies that wish to
explore the abilities of human brain to create culture and also search for the
fundamental units of culture. Neurological studies have created the notion of
the node, the complex network of a large number of neurons. Experts think that
the elements of culture are hierarchised elements of the semantic memory.
Several expressions are used for these: mnemotype, idea, idene, meme,
sociogene, culturgen, culture type. The most widely accepted of these is
“meme”, introduced by Richard Dawkins in 1976 in his work The Selfish Gene.
(13) In 1981 the complete theory of gene/culture coevolution was developed by
Wilson and Charles J. Lumsden. (14) In their view the fundamental unit of
culture (meme) corresponds to the nodes of the semantic memory and their
equivalents in brain activities. The level of the node (notion, statement or
scheme) determines the complexity of the thought, behaviour or object that it
helps to maintain in the entirety of culture. Obviously, behaviour is not
determined or caused by genes or culture, since it is the joint product of
heredity and the environment. The science of interaction uses reaction norm as the key concept,
referring to how a gene or group of genes changes its characteristics within
its environment. Let me bring an example: Frank Sulloway’s studies seem to
prove that human characteristics and behaviour greatly depend on the birth
order and the person’s role in family dynamics. Third or laterborns, frustrated
by their older siblings tend to be more rebellious. They become deviants,
anarchists or revolutionists. (15) The impact of being a laterborn is the
reaction norm itself.
It was also found that people not only choose
their roles according to their abilities and personalities, but also try to
choose an environment where their inherited traits can be used successfully.
Therefore, there is a genotype/environment correlation. Another important
characteristic of heredity (apart from reaction norm) is flexibility. This
promises you to get the best results by trying to develop individuals, instead
of groups. All social policies, aimed at changing hereditary traits, are doomed
to failure. My stepfather told me in the 1950’s that the reason for communism’s
failure would be its inability to change the human nature.
In order to create the unity of biology and
social sciences, we must clarify the notions of reaction norm and
inheritability, locate genes influencing behaviour and also identify their
correlation with the environment. That will give us a fuller picture on the
development of the mind and enable us to explain for example how schizophrenia
influences culture. We already have the key methods for the genetics of human
behaviour, such as twin study, genealogy, genetic mapping and identifying DNA
sequences.
There are three main levels of biological
organisation, from top to bottom: Universalities of culture, 2. Ontogenetic
rules of social behaviour, 3. Behavioural genetics.
Universalities of culture are all behaviour
forms and institutions that can be found in each of the several hundred
societies studied so far. Murdock found 67 such universalities from athletics,
through the separation of age groups to weaving. (16) Others use dispositions
to get to the notion of “predisposed learning” (susceptibility), which is an
evolutionary trend. We are predisposed to learn certain types of behaviour and
avoid others. (17) The predisposed learning of social behaviour usually helps
us to adapt.
4. The structure of culture
We can conclude that until we stop neglecting
the available results of natural sciences and start organising the joint
cognitive strategies of natural and social sciences, we shall not have
significant achievements in the research of such problems as, for example, what
is information society, how do infocommunication devices become more widely
used, what effect will they have on society and so on. The success of medical
science lies in the fact that it relies on the solid and uniform foundation of
molecular and cellular biology. Social scientists, including sociologists, also
have an immense amount of factual information and techniques for complicated
statistical analyses. However, since they/we reject the principles of
hierarchised knowledge, we are hardly able to detect any order from the
multitude of opinion polls and info-statistics. Instead we opt for the morale
of chaos. These data give us a basic structure of social behaviour, but we fail
to come up with the theory itself. We cannot fit what we learn into the
physical realities of human biology and psychology. Social scientists are in a
paradoxical situation: the familiar subject brings a sense of security, which
leads to carelessness and mistakes. Let me give you an example: The
anthropological school of Franz Boas hailed cultural relativism with the slogan
of “Long live multiculturalism”. (18) If all subcultures were equal, we reject
inherited behavioural differences. In that case what makes mankind unified, if
not our culture or our common genetic heritage? Would cannibalism, circumcising
young girls with rusty razors or chopping off arms and legs be equal to modern nutrition,
sexual hygiene or the institutions of modern jurisdiction? How is it possible
that biological and cultural anthropologists cannot provide a uniform answer to
important questions?
Robert Nisbet points out that instead of the
logical extension of natural sciences, modern sociology developed from Western
spirituality (freedom, social order, progressive changes), where individual
minds and social institutions merge. (19) Rationality is turned upside down.
Human minds do not produce culture, but arise as their own product. Research
strategies focus on society as a whole (a societal system) and neglect its
“cells”, “molecules” and “elements”. Descriptive and analytic sociology is
obviously science, but without a real theory. And until we have a theory on
what “society” is, we cannot answer the question “What is Information
Society?”.
Redfield detects a dual structure in large
civilisations: “large tradition” and “small tradition”. (20) The former can be
called as “high (classic, elite, learnt) culture” and the latter as “low”,
“folk” or “local” culture. This is a system of relations where small tradition
is not an independent local culture, but the unconscious continuity and
survival of a local culture within a governing large tradition. Small traditions
adopt the achievements of civilisation from large traditions. In Israel, for
example, I saw colour televisions in Bedouine tents in 1993 and a street beggar
with a portable radio in India in the 70’s and 80’s.
We talk about traditions when folk culture and
customs remain unchanged, together with the use of great technical
achievements. Here we see something “changing” and something “unchanged” in
human culture and customs. During the diffusion of every invention we must
remember that people like what they are accustomed to. That is why new meanings
usually appear in old forms. That’s when they are successful. The first cars,
with their high seats, resembled the hansom-cabs, first aeroplanes were similar
to bicycles. We also see the opposite when old forms become empty.
As you can see, I wish to prove the argument
that technical development is culture-dependent. What is important here is not
innovation itself, but its penetration, the diffusion of innovation. This is
the real social (culture-dependent) problem. The meme concept of Richard
Dawkins is related to the “small tradition”, which is none other than the
heredity of cultural forms. Obviously, the reason, timing and amount for
ordinary people to use IT innovations will depend on what they feel advantageous
in their conditions. Information Society can be a “large tradition”, but only
if it is translated into “small traditions”. “Small traditions” survive through
the transfer of traditions, but in “large traditions” people understand the
truth of a certain idea and accept the usefulness of a technical device. For
example, does the Ministry of Informatics and Communications know today, how
its “judgements”, views and programmes will be followed unconsciously in
smaller communities? Ideas are accepted, but customs are kept. (21) To give a
current example: the strategy of Information Society is an “idea”, but can it
take people’s “customs” into consideration? What do all currently available
data on the number of PCs, telephones and so on in the country tell us about
“idea” of IT or about people’s “customs”? Are they about “„ideas” or “customs”?
Or neither maybe? What do we mean by “interpretation”? Our (we, as the elite,
experts, politicians) own “knowledgeable”, “enlightened” interpretation? The
“learnt interpretation” of ordinary people? The “unconscious transfer of
traditions” in people?
One of the key problems in the study of culture
is how the thoughts of certain (elite) individuals can spread in wider groups
of society. Sperber uses an analogue from epidemiology, comparing thought
transfer to the spreading of infectious diseases. (22) Representations are
infectious agents. Here we already have two theories to explain the diffusion
of innovations. In Dawkins’ theory the adoption of memes is based on “imitation
in the wider sense” and according to Sperber, viruses tend to spread
consciously and they are the characteristics of large traditions. I think that
both diffusion mechanisms can be found in small and large traditions as well.
(see: the transfer of fashion, epidemics or technical devices.) We don’t
exactly know whether society has its own cultural immune system that resists
certain “infections”, such as the diffusion or proper use of infocommunication
devices. This is what I call “resistance” after Jánossy.
5. From genes to the use of
devices
My
suggestion in the present paper is that knowledge deficit, concerning the use
and acceptance of infocommunication techniques, should be reduced and possibly
eliminated by systematic multidisciplinary research, based on the cooperation
of natural, engineering and social sciences. Our relation to technical devices
is obviously influenced by our genetic traits, which we bring into our lives as
biological beings, but during our evolution our cultural traits also develop,
turning us into conscious and civilised social beings. That is why I urge
research, aimed at the unity of natural and social sciences, as well as the
integration of knowledge in various social sciences and humanities (human
ethology, cultural anthropology, individual and social psychology, sociology
and so on). In the modern age, the use of infocommunication devices can become
the tool of existential survival, and this includes “man’s” biological and
social determination.
In my view, considering biological
evolution from the aspect of infocommunication techniques means that masses of
genetically conditioned individual decisions are merged into social patterns.
During this filo- and ontogenetic evolution cultural patterns can be influenced
by the genetic heritage. Let me give you a few examples:
1.
Categories
of individual choice, forms and activities of momentary thinking presuppose
each other. Needs and potentials of one category influence the strength of the
others. The ranking of these categories however, such as sexuality, maintaining
social status, games, seems to be genetically fixed.
2.
Certain
needs and potentials may cancel each other. Certain situations produce emotions
that erase the activities of other categories.
3.
Rational
calculations are based on competing rushes of emotions.
4.
Rational
deliberation is often altruistic.
5.
Decisions
are group-dependent.
6.
Decision-making
in every category is determined by evolutionary rules. Certain options are
learnt more easily and strongly depend on gender and age. Think about how
easily children and young people learn the use of new technical devices,
compared with old people. Decisions and behaviours, related to the use of
devices, are psychologically and biologically complex, and also condition
cultural patterns.
Evolutionary biology demonstrates
that the following things are important to humans, as adjusted primates: sex,
family, work, security, self-expression, entertainment and spiritual
fulfilment. Innovation and trade policies could be based on this perception. If
new technical devices fulfil these needs, people will need them. The wider use
of mobile phones among older people is a tool for increased security, survival
of dangerous situations, therefore biological self-preservation.
Fortunately, bridges are already being built
between isolated areas of reality. There are four of these: cognitive
neuroscience, behaviour-genetics, evolutionary biology and environmental
science.
Answers to such problems, as the break-up of
American inner-city families, the influx of provincial population into Mexico
City, the resistance of the French middle class against the euro, the reasons
for the opposition and distrust towards computers and so on, take into
consideration that behaviour is governed by evolutionary rules, which are also
governed by emotions. People are influenced by emotions, mentalities,
approaches, values, traditions and lifestyles during their social
decision-making. It is not by chance that in recent years many Nobel Prizes for
Economics have been awarded to scientists, who also focus on factors
influencing the human and psychological decisions and choices in economic
processes. Gary S. Becker for example received the Nobel Prize in 1992 because
he extended economics to human behaviour. (23) People are driven by their basic
needs, but also have other motivations. Their decisions are influenced by their
own experiences and the diversity of social forces, which are beyond the
individual’s control. Economic models therefore must incorporate the values
represented by the usefulness of choices for the decision-maker. Becker assumed
that people make rational choices. Other economists go even further. They not
only consider man as a rational, but also as an irrational being. In that case
people’s choices may depend on their childhood experiences, social conditions
and cultural impacts. Economic decisions therefore are not purely economic, but
highly complex decisions with a psychobiological context. Today we still have
the prevailing view that people make rational choices. They choose the option,
which is most beneficial for them. This, however, is not a true picture of
human thinking. Another Nobel laureate, economist Herbert Simon proved as early
as 1957 that people usually don’t choose the optimal solution. (24) It may
easily happen that the heuristic principle of Tversky and Kahneman prevails,
according to which people make their decisions by the “rule of thumb”. (25)
What is certain is that human behaviours
related to the information society (in spite of the genetic bases) must be
regarded as cultural phenomena. If this is true, we accept that these are
living organisms, self-organising systems. At this point we realise that the
idea of knowledge society evolves into a classic utopia (fair and equal society,
optimistic perspectives, information will belong to everyone, the Western way
of life and democracy will prevail, we shall have an open society and so on).
Is it possible that globalisation and its associated idea of the Information
Society (as a “large tradition”) is the ideology of the currently ruling elite,
which will be either resisted by society’s “small traditions” or accepted, but
transformed into their own image?
6. Man and infocommunication techniques
So far I hardly spoke about infocommunication
techniques, which “man” becomes associated with. It is time I discussed this
relation. Today this can be mainly established by measuring. Let me ask the
following questions: aren’t traditional measuring practices in crisis, do we
use correct measuring techniques and do we know what we are measuring?
What do ICT (Information and
Communication Technology) indices measure? Only the degree of supply and the
diffusion of devices. The subjective determination of social actions only
exists in a mentality where those carrying out the actions acknowledge the
reality of society. The weakness of measurement is when we consider collected
signals as “data” and in most cases put them into “numbers”. We collect signals
in the form of numbers and masses of figures, while we forget about the
“meaning” of these signals. The “meaning” of a data (number, signal) is only
revealed in its context. A social phenomenon can only be truly understood if we
describe, measure and count it from the outside, but also “understand” it from
the inside. All our methods to learn about reality have a twofold meaning:
“subjective” and “objective”. The “objective meaning” can only be grasped if we
develop the “correct sense” for its perception.
Public-opinion researchers, probably reacting
to political needs, mostly measure the presence and growth of Information
Society with how the number and usage intensity of these technical devices
rise. They keep collecting traditional, objective data and fail to explore the
subjective meaning that people give to their newly owned technical devices. I
took the time and analysed the questions in the eEurope+ indicator list,
adopted from the European Union. I shall go through the 23 points of the EU’s
questionnaire and try to add certain aspects to make it “valid for Hungary” and
also add more sociological focus method of questioning. These recommendations
will probably be the best response to the topic of this conference,
demonstrating my view of the relationship between infocommunication devices and
man.
1) Question on the ratio of regular Internet
users within the population:
The
access points (home, work, school, community access, Internet café) aspect is
acceptable. Access points marked as „other” should be more detailed, since
today this is 2%, including PIAPs and Cyber Cafés. It would be interesting to
know what other places are available for Internet use? What about laptops that
can be used anywhere and cannot be localised.
Furthermore:
apart from “regular” users we should know more about “irregular”, “occasional”
Internet users. Why don’t they use this device regularly? Is it because they
have no access, not interested, can’t use it or are not prepared for its use?2)
We should not only know the ratio of households with Internet access, but also
the ratio of usage among family members? Who uses it, what for, what is the
meaning of “household”? What do people consider as household? Family, people
living together, co-tenants, flatmates?
For
frequency of use, instead of such standards as daily, weekly and monthly use,
we should see the length of usage. People probably use the Internet more at
weekends than weekdays. They use it more at evenings at nights – it’s not very
good for their lifestyle, but they are forced to choose it for financial reasons.
3)
Access charges: those without unlimited access, paying for their own Internet
use are forced to limit the time spent on-line. People match their Internet use
to their budget. We should ask what subscription fees certain groups would
still consider to be worth paying for the Internet?
The part about the “reason for
usage” is very important. We should find out what (types of contents) people
generally look for on the net? If they use it for purchases, what do they buy
on-line? If they are looking for information, what type of information do they
need? If they use it for work, what types of activities do they use it for? For
e-mails, what is the purpose of the letters? Work, friendship, contacts?
4)
The Internet access of researchers and students: we shouldn’t only focus on the
speed of services, but also whether these users have easy or difficult access,
if they are ready for these applications, what they use them for, whether the
contents are (student) specific, how and why researchers use the Internet,
whether they are satisfied.
5)
As far as the number of secure servers is concerned, what do people consider
„secure”?
6) Those with security problems, what type of
problems have they encountered?
7-8)
In the case of PCs and Internet access per hundred students, we should explore
again whether they are satisfied with the access? Is it easy or difficult to go
on-line? Do they have enough time for usage? Do they receive enough help for
their Internet use? Are they prepared for it? Are they satisfied with the
contents they get?
9) The same questions can be asked for
broadband access.
10) Apart from the ratio of teachers
who use the Internet regularly, we should also know the following: who are
these teachers, how did they gain their computer literacy, are they prepared,
what do they use it for, can they access the contents and what do they think
about them? How much do they use their PC at home or at school?
11)
Ratio of workforce with basic IT training: what do we mean by basic training?
Where and why was it attained, what is it good for, what suggestions or
problems do these people have?
12)
In the case of postgradual ICT courses, apart from the number of graduates we
should also find out where and how they heard about the course, did they need
it, what was the course like, are they satisfied with the training, can they
use what they learnt, do they think the money and time invested were worth it,
what do they think about the quality of training?
13)
Ratio of distant workers: why do they do it, what does their work involve, are
they satisfied with it, is it a substitute for other activities, were they
willing or forced to do it, is it profitable, what would they do if they could
influence their own affairs, people of what age and qualifications choose to do
distant work?
14)
Ratio of Public Internet Access Points: apart from the ratio we should also
explore the following: who uses these access points, how often, what kind of
knowledge do they have, what are their interests, are the PCs operated by these
users or others, do they get it as a service, is it self-service, what do they
think of the costs, what do they save by using PIAPs, what is their motivation
for using these access points and not others?
15)
Ratio of government websites: what is the content of these sites, who uses them
and how often, what information do they receive from these sites, what can be
arranged, does it make their life easier, are they satisfied, are the pages
up-to-date, are they satisfied with the search systems, are people prepared to
search or read these sites?
16)
Ratio of Internet business: what motivations influence Internet business, what
types of products are sold, what is the level of interest towards these types
of commerce, what do people say about the security, quality, speed and level of
services?
17)
On-line services: the aspects are similar to point 15, but mainly focusing on
municipalities and self-government services. Do people use them, what do they
use, do these services meet people’s needs, what is missing, are they fast
enough, are they technically up-to-date, are they secure? Do people have
sufficient access to PCs, knowledge and motivation for the use of electronic
services? If not, why?
18)
Government information services and help provided for filling in forms: what do
people use and in what ratio? How do they use it? What needs and suggestions do
they have? How much time can they save by these services? If they are not
satisfied with these services, what is the problem?
19)
Ratio of public contracts: I do not have any suggestions, because I am not
familiar with this area.
20)
Ratio of healthcare service providers: we shouldn’t just focus on gathering the
figures but we should know what types of services are available electronically.
Who uses these electronic services, which ones do they use and why? Which
population groups prefer or reject these services? Who is unable to use these
services?
21)
Content types of doctors’ Internet use: which healthcare professionals use it,
why, what for and how? Are they prepared to use the Internet, can they use
on-line services, can they have access to proper PCs and programmes in time?
What is their opinion, what are their problems and suggestions?
22)
Ratio of EU websites: again, we shouldn’t just focus on gathering the figures,
but find out what is the European perspective of various segments and groups of
the Hungarian population, do they speak foreign languages, can they use
foreign-language search systems, what are their needs and what do they use
these sites for?
23)
Motorways traffic and control systems: we have the supply data, but it would be
interesting to know whether people need intelligent transport systems, devices,
roads and services? Do they use them, can they afford them, what additional
services do they need?
On
reviewing the EU-list we see that it is Internet-specific. However, we cannot
say that Information Society only means the diffusion of Internet use. In order
to monitor Information Society, we cannot settle for only observing and
discussing IT. It is obvious that we do not have a system of indices (criteria)
for measuring and monitoring IT. Ceterum censeo: it is not ICT
(infocommunication technologies), but IS (Information Society) that we should
monitor.
Conclusions
Politics (politicians) can afford to ignore
such questions. They can carry on believing that traditional methods can gather
data on all sorts of phenomena, which are measurable, but irrelevant. However,
they can choose to consider the characteristics of the “social matter and
energy”, just like natural scientists and engineers do during their research.
If we cannot use voluntarism in researching Nature, what is the reason for the
irresponsible attitude of politicians that we sometimes see? They often ignore the immanent nature of the
“material” they are working with. In one of my previous research topics I
examined the reasons for the failure of political programmes. I believe that
these programmes often fail, because they are not aimed to itemise and understand
the immanent characteristics of the very thing they try to control (Society).
It has been proven many times during history and social development that
superficial and incorrect assumptions about society and people will backfire.
Throughout crises and failures, Society in the long term always corrects
political mistakes and only implements what is there as a potential anyway.
Usually no more or less.
People (from politicians to citizens) are
flooded with information. The next evolutionary step will probably be to learn
to match, integrate and synthesise these fragments of information. As a sign of
my optimism, let me finally quote David Hilbert on the essence of
Enlightenment: “Wir müssen wissen. Wir werden müssen”. (“We
must know, we shall know”.)
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